Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (1998) Social choice theory, game theory, and positive political theory. Annual Review of Political Science, 1 . pp. 259-287. ISSN 1094-2939. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.259. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:AUSarps98
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Abstract
We consider the relationships between the collective preference and non-cooperative game theory approaches to positive political theory. In particular, we show that an apparently decisive difference between the two approachesthat in sufficiently complex environments (e.g. high-dimensional choice spaces) direct preference aggregation models are incapable of generating any prediction at all, whereas non-cooperative game-theoretic models almost always generate predictionis indeed only an apparent difference. More generally, we argue that when modeling collective decisions there is a fundamental tension between insuring existence of well-defined predictions, a criterion of minimal democracy, and general applicability to complex environments; while any two of the three are compatible under either approach, neither collective preference nor non-cooperative game theory can support models that simultaneously satisfy all three desiderata.
Item Type: | Article | ||||||
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Additional Information: | © 1998 by Annual Reviews. This paper was completed while the second author was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. He gratefully acknowledges the financial support provided by the National Science Foundation under Grant SBR-9601236. | ||||||
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Subject Keywords: | core existence, Nash equilibrium, minimal democracy | ||||||
DOI: | 10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.259 | ||||||
Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:AUSarps98 | ||||||
Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:AUSarps98 | ||||||
Official Citation: | Social choice theory, game theory, and positive political theory. David Austen-Smith Jeffrey S. Banks. Annual Review of Political Science 1998 1:1, 259-287; doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.259 | ||||||
Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||
ID Code: | 690 | ||||||
Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||
Deposited By: | Archive Administrator | ||||||
Deposited On: | 14 Sep 2005 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 08 Nov 2021 19:04 |
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