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Computation and incentives in combinatorial public projects

Buchfuhrer, Dave and Schapira, Michael and Singer, Yaron (2010) Computation and incentives in combinatorial public projects. In: EC '10 Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce. ACM , New York, NY, pp. 33-42. ISBN 978-1-60558-822-3. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160812-110434756

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Abstract

The Combinatorial Public Projects Problem (CPPP) is an abstraction of resource allocation problems in which agents have preferences over alternatives, and an outcome that is to be collectively shared by the agents is chosen so as to maximize the social welfare. We explore CPPP from both computational and mechanism design perspectives. We examine CPPP in the hierarchy of complement-free (subadditive) valuation classes and present positive and negative results for both unrestricted and truthful algorithms.


Item Type:Book Section
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807342.1807348DOIArticle
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=1807342.1807348PublisherArticle
Additional Information:© 2010 ACM. [DB] Supported by NSF CCF-0346991, CCF-0830787 and BSF 2004329. [MS] Supported by NSF grant 0331548. [YS] Supported by the Microsoft Research fellowship.
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFCCF-0346991
NSFCCF-0830787
Binational Science Foundation (USA-Israel)2004329
Microsoft ResearchUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Algorithms, Theory, Economics, Algorithmic mechanism design
Classification Code:F.2 [Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complex- ity]: ,; J.4 [Social and Behavioral Science]: [Economics]
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20160812-110434756
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160812-110434756
Official Citation:Dave Buchfuhrer, Michael Schapira, and Yaron Singer. 2010. Computation and incentives in combinatorial public projects. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce (EC '10). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 33-42. DOI=http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807342.1807348
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:69589
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Kristin Buxton
Deposited On:12 Aug 2016 23:25
Last Modified:12 Aug 2016 23:25

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