Chen, Kay-Yut and Hogg, Tad and Wozny, Nathan (2004) Experimental Study of Market Reputation Mechanisms. In: EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce. ACM , New York, NY, pp. 234-235. ISBN 1-58113-771-0. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160819-161905457
![[img]](https://authors.library.caltech.edu/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png) |
PDF
- Published Version
See Usage Policy. 106kB |
Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160819-161905457
Abstract
We experimentally compare low-information, high-information and self-reporting reputation mechanisms. The results indicate players strategically reacted to the reputation mechanisms, with higher information mechanisms increasing market efficiency.
| Item Type: | Book Section | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Related URLs: |
| |||||||||
| Additional Information: | Copyright is held by the author/owner(s). | |||||||||
| Subject Keywords: | Economics, Experimentation, Human Factors, experimental economics, reputation, markets | |||||||||
| Classification Code: | J.4 [Computer Applications ]: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES | |||||||||
| DOI: | 10.1145/988772.988810 | |||||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20160819-161905457 | |||||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160819-161905457 | |||||||||
| Official Citation: | Kay-Yut Chen, Tad Hogg, and Nathan Wozny. 2004. Experimental study of market reputation mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce (EC '04). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 234-235. DOI=http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/988772.988810 | |||||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | |||||||||
| ID Code: | 69801 | |||||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | |||||||||
| Deposited By: | Kristin Buxton | |||||||||
| Deposited On: | 22 Aug 2016 22:30 | |||||||||
| Last Modified: | 11 Nov 2021 04:20 |
Repository Staff Only: item control page
