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Aggregate matchings

Echenique, Federico and Lee, SangMok and Shum, Matthew (2010) Aggregate matchings. In: BQGT '10 Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions. ACM , New York, NY, Art. No. 71. ISBN 978-1-60558-919-0.

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This paper characterizes the testable implications of stability for aggregate matchings. We consider data on matchings where individuals are aggregated, based on their observable characteristics, into types, and we know how many agents of each type match. We derive stability conditions for an aggregate matching, and, based on these, provide a simple necessary and sufficient condition for an observed aggregate matching to be rationalizable (i.e. such that preferences can be found so that the observed aggregate matching is stable). Subsequently, we derive moment inequalities based on the stability conditions, and provide an empirical illustration using the cross-sectional marriage distributions across the US states.

Item Type:Book Section
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemWorking Paper
Echenique, Federico0000-0002-1567-6770
Shum, Matthew0000-0002-6262-915X
Additional Information:© 2010 ACM.
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20161018-153505782
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Official Citation:Federique Echenique, SangMok Lee, and Matthew Shum. 2010. Aggregate matchings. In Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions (BQGT '10). ACM, New York, NY, USA, , Article 71 , 1 pages. DOI=
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:71240
Deposited By: Kristin Buxton
Deposited On:18 Oct 2016 22:59
Last Modified:26 Nov 2019 11:15

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