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Social Learning Equilibria

Mossel, Elchanan and Mueller-Frank, Manuel and Sly, Allan and Tamuz, Omer (2018) Social Learning Equilibria. In: Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. Association for Computing Machinery , New York, NY, p. 639. ISBN 978-1-4503-5829-3.

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We consider social learning settings in which a group of agents face uncertainty regarding a state of the world, observe private signals, share the same utility function, and act in a general dynamic setting. We introduce Social Learning Equilibria, a static equilibrium concept that abstracts away from the details of the given dynamics, but nevertheless captures the corresponding asymptotic equilibrium behavior. We establish strong equilibrium properties on agreement, herding, and information aggregation.

Item Type:Book Section
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription Paper ItemJournal Article
Mossel, Elchanan0000-0001-7812-7886
Tamuz, Omer0000-0002-0111-0418
Alternate Title:On Agreement and Learning
Additional Information:© 2018 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Elchanan Mossel is supported by awards NSF DMS-1737944, ONR N00014-17-1-2598, and CCF 1665252. Manuel Mueller-Frank gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Ref. ECO2015-63711-P). Omer Tamuz is supported by a grant from the Simons Foundation (#419427).
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Office of Naval Research (ONR)N00014-17-1-2598
Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad (MINECO)ECO2015-63711-P
Simons Foundation419427
Subject Keywords:Consensus; Learning; Herding
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20161111-104138106
Persistent URL:
Official Citation:Elchanan Mossel, Manuel Mueller-Frank, Allan Sly, and Omer Tamuz. 2018. Social Learning Equilibria. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC '18). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 639-639. DOI:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:71939
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:16 Nov 2016 00:44
Last Modified:21 May 2020 22:29

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