A Caltech Library Service

A lower bound on seller revenue in single buyer monopoly auctions

Tamuz, Omer (2012) A lower bound on seller revenue in single buyer monopoly auctions. . (Submitted)

[img] PDF - Submitted Version
See Usage Policy.


Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


We consider a monopoly seller who optimally auctions a single object to a single potential buyer, with a known distribution of valuations. We show that a tight lower bound on the seller’s expected revenue is 1/e times the geometric expectation of the buyer’s valuation, and that this bound is uniquely achieved for the equal revenue distribution. We show also that when the valuation’s expectation and geometric expectation are close, then the seller’s expected revenue is close to the expected valuation.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Discussion Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription Paper
Tamuz, Omer0000-0002-0111-0418
Additional Information:Submitted on 25 Apr 2012 (v1), last revised 7 Oct 2013 (this version, v2). October 8, 2013. We would like to thank Elchanan Mossel for commenting on a preliminary version of this paper. We owe a debt of gratitude to the anonymous reviewer who helped us improve the paper significantly through many helpful suggestions. This research is supported by ISF grant 1300/08, and by a Google Europe Fellowship in Social Computing.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Israel Science Foundation1300/08
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20161114-065718415
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:71969
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:16 Nov 2016 00:11
Last Modified:16 Nov 2016 00:11

Repository Staff Only: item control page