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Characterizing Truthfulness In Discrete Domains

Mu'alem, Ahuva and Schapira, Michael (2008) Characterizing Truthfulness In Discrete Domains. ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 7 (2). Art. No. 5. ISSN 1551-9031. doi:10.1145/1399589.1399594.

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Algorithmic mechanism design [9; 10] focuses on the design of algorithms that aim to achieve global objectives in settings in which the "input" is provided by self-interested strategic players2. This necessitates the design of algorithms that are incentive-compatible (a.k.a. truthful 3) in the sense that players are incentivized via payments to behave as instructed. The most natural approach to designing incentive-compatible algorithms is coming up with an algorithm and an explicit payment scheme that guarantees its incentive-compatibility. However, finding appropriate payments is often a difficult, setting-specific, task, which is mostly achievable for very simple types of algorithms.

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Additional Information:© 2008 ACM. Supported by grants from the Israel Science Foundation.
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Israel Science FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20161201-133836635
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Official Citation:Ahuva Mu'alem and Michael Schapria. 2008. Characterizing truthfulness in discrete domains. SIGecom Exch. 7, 2, Article 5 (June 2008), 3 pages. DOI=
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:72501
Deposited On:02 Dec 2016 02:29
Last Modified:11 Nov 2021 05:02

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