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Deliberation Welcomes Prediction

Hájek, Alan (2016) Deliberation Welcomes Prediction. Episteme, 13 (4). pp. 507-528. ISSN 1742-3600. doi:10.1017/epi.2016.27.

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According to the so-called ‘deliberation crowds out prediction’ thesis, while deliberating about what you'll do, you cannot rationally have credences for what you'll do – you cannot rationally have option-credences. Versions of the thesis have been defended by authors such as Spohn, Levi, Gilboa, Price, Louise, and others. After registering a number of concerns about the thesis, I rehearse and rebut many of the main arguments for it, grouped according to their main themes: agency, vacuity, betting, and decision-theoretical considerations. I go on to suggest many possible theoretical roles for option-credences. I locate the debate about the thesis in a broader discussion: Are there rational credence gaps – propositions to which one cannot rationally assign credences? If there are, they spell trouble for various foundations of Bayesian epistemology, including the usual ratio formula for conditional probability, conditionalization, decision theory, and independence. According to the thesis, credence gaps are completely mundane; they arise every time someone rationally deliberates. But these foundations are safe from any threat here, I contend, since the thesis is false. Deliberation welcomes prediction.

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Additional Information:© 2016 Cambridge University Press. Published online: 15 December 2016.
Issue or Number:4
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170201-155553711
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:73964
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:02 Feb 2017 02:39
Last Modified:11 Nov 2021 05:23

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