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Equilibrium agenda formation

Dutta, Bhaskar and Jackson, Matthew O. and Le Breton, Michel (2004) Equilibrium agenda formation. Social Choice and Welfare, 23 (1). pp. 21-57. ISSN 0176-1714. doi:10.1007/s00355-003-0233-y.

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We develop a definition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The definition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto efficient voting rule is uniquely determined, and in fact coincides with that of the outcomes generated by considering all full agendas. Under voting by successive elimination (or amendment), the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponds with the Banks set. We also examine the implications in several specific settings and show that studying equilibrium agendas can lead to sharp predictions, in contrast with well-known “chaos” theorems.

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Jackson, Matthew O.0000-0001-9846-4249
Additional Information:© Springer-Verlag 2004. Received: 13 September 2002/Accepted: 5 March 2003. Financial support under NSF grant SES-9986190 and an RTDF grant from the University of Warwick are gratefully acknowledged. We thank John Duggan, Martin Osborne, and an anonymous referee for valuable suggestions, and participants at the Sixth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare for helpful comments.
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University of WarwickUNSPECIFIED
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Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170408-150755689
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Official Citation:Dutta, B., Jackson, M. & Breton, M. Soc Choice Welfare (2004) 23: 21. doi:10.1007/s00355-003-0233-y
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:76026
Deposited By: 1Science Import
Deposited On:04 May 2017 23:26
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 16:57

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