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Belief Updating in Sequential Games of Two-Sided Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study of a Crisis Bargaining Model

Tingley, Dustin H. and Wang, Stephanie W. (2010) Belief Updating in Sequential Games of Two-Sided Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study of a Crisis Bargaining Model. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 5 (3). pp. 243-255. ISSN 1554-0626. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170408-164833685

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Abstract

We investigate theoretically and experimentally the crisis bargaining model, a dynamic game of two-sided incomplete information with player types drawn from a commonly known distribution. Little work has been done to analyze whether and how players update their beliefs in such games.Within the experiment we elicited beliefs from players about their opponent's type using a proper scoring rule. We implement two treatments that vary the cost of backing down to the first mover after initial entry, generating sharp comparative static predictions in both beliefs and strategies. We find that players do update their beliefs in the predicted directions after observing some of the action choices. However, we highlight evidence of conservative updating relative to rational expectations.


Item Type:Article
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00010012DOIArticle
Additional Information:© 2010 D. H. Tingley and S. W. Wang. MS submitted 23 February 2010; final version received 22 September 2010. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from Princeton’s Research Program in Political Economy. We thank Scott Ashworth, Roland Benabou, Raymond Hicks, Jens Grosser, Stephen Morris, Kristopher Ramsay, Adam Meirowitz and Thomas Palfrey for helpful discussions. Paper previously presented at the CESS-NYU 2008 Experimental Political Science Conference, the Princeton Lunchtime Political Methodology Meeting, and the 2007 Economic Science Association Annual Meeting, Tuscon, Arizona.
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Princeton UniversityUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Formal modelling, Game theory
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170408-164833685
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170408-164833685
Official Citation:Dustin H. Tingley and Stephanie W. Wang (2010), "Belief Updating in Sequential Games of Two-Sided Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study of a Crisis Bargaining Model", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 5: No. 3, pp 243-255. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00010012
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:76255
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: 1Science Import
Deposited On:09 Mar 2018 18:55
Last Modified:09 Mar 2018 18:56

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