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Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching

Echenique, Federico and Galichon, Alfred (2017) Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching. Games and Economic Behavior, 101 . pp. 63-77. ISSN 0899-8256. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.002.

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We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable- and in the nontransferable-utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade stable matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade stable matching is one in which the availability of transfers does not affect the outcome.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemWorking Paper Paper
Echenique, Federico0000-0002-1567-6770
Additional Information:© 2015 Elsevier Inc. Received 1 May 2014, Available online 21 October 2015. The authors wish to thank Juan Pereyra Barreiro and Aditya Kuvalekar for many useful suggestions, and for pointing out a mistake in one of the examples in a previous version of the paper. 2This research has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013)/ ERC grant agreement no 313699.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
European Research Council (ERC)313699
Subject Keywords:Market design; Matching theory; National resident matching program
Classification Code:JEL: C72; C78
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170417-152127453
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Official Citation:Federico Echenique, Alfred Galichon, Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 101, January 2017, Pages 63-77, ISSN 0899-8256, (
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:76619
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:18 Apr 2017 00:01
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 17:01

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