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Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design

Krajbich, Ian and Camerer, Colin and Rangel, Antonio (2017) Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design. Games and Economic Behavior, 101 . pp. 49-62. ISSN 0899-8256. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170418-111055772

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Abstract

A basic goal in mechanism design is to construct mechanisms that simultaneously satisfy efficiency, voluntary participation, and dominant strategy incentive compatibility. Previous work has shown that this is impossible, unless the agents and planner have sufficient information about each other and common knowledge. These results have remained largely theoretical because the required information is generally not available in practical applications. However, recent work has shown that these limitations can be overcome in simple settings, using neurometric technologies that provide noisy signals of subjects' preferences that can be used in the mechanism design problem. Here we build on this work by carrying out two new experiments designed to test the extent to which these Neurometrically Informed Mechanisms (NIMs) can be applied to more complicated and realistic environments. We find robustness to large type and action space and to the degrees of loss and risk-aversion observed in most of our sample.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.001DOIArticle
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825616300264PublisherArticle
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Camerer, Colin0000-0003-4049-1871
Additional Information:© 2016 Elsevier Inc. Received 2 March 2015; Available online 20 May 2016. We thank John Ledyard for his invaluable contributions to this work and Phil Reny for his helpful comments on earlier drafts.
Subject Keywords:Mechanism design; Experiments; Neuroeconomics; Behavioral economics; Public goods; Decision making
Classification Code:JEL: D82; D87; H41
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170418-111055772
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170418-111055772
Official Citation:Ian Krajbich, Colin Camerer, Antonio Rangel, Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 101, January 2017, Pages 49-62, ISSN 0899-8256, http://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.001. (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825616300264)
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:76635
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:18 Apr 2017 18:19
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 17:03

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