A Caltech Library Service

On the efficiency of networked Stackelberg competition

Xu, Yunjian and Cai, Desmond and Bose, Subhonmesh and Wierman, Adam (2017) On the efficiency of networked Stackelberg competition. In: 51st Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS). IEEE , Piscataway, NJ. ISBN 978-1-5090-4780-2.

Full text is not posted in this repository. Consult Related URLs below.

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


We study the impact of strategic anticipative behavior in networked markets. We focus on the case of electricity markets and model the market as a game between a system operator (market maker) and generators at different nodes of the network. Generators submit quantity bids and the system operator balances demand and supply over the network subject to transmission constraints. We compare the efficiency of a networked Stackelberg equilibrium, where generators anticipate the market clearing actions of the market maker, with a networked Cournot equilibrium, where they do not. We show that networked Cournot equilibria always exists but its efficiency loss is unbounded in the worst case. In contrast, networked Stackelberg equilibria do not always exist, but in certain settings where they do exist, the efficiency loss may be bounded above by a constant.

Item Type:Book Section
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
Cai, Desmond0000-0001-9207-1890
Additional Information:© 2017 IEEE. This work was supported in part by NSF through grants CNS-1319820, EPAS-1307794.
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170517-152204343
Persistent URL:
Official Citation:Y. Xu, D. Cai, S. Bose and A. Wierman, "On the efficiency of networked Stackelberg competition," 2017 51st Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS), Baltimore, MD, USA, 2017, pp. 1-6. doi: 10.1109/CISS.2017.7926159
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:77533
Deposited By: Kristin Buxton
Deposited On:17 May 2017 22:43
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 17:58

Repository Staff Only: item control page