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Demand response with capacity constrained supply function bidding

Xu, Yunjian and Li, Na and Low, Steven (2016) Demand response with capacity constrained supply function bidding. In: 2016 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting. IEEE , Piscataway, NJ. ISBN 978-1-5090-4168-8.

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We study the problem faced by an operator who aims to allocate a certain amount of load adjustment (either load reduction or increment) to multiple consumers so as to minimize the aggregate consumer disutility. We propose and analyze a simple uniform-price market mechanism where every consumer submits a single bid to choose a supply function from a group of parameterized ones. These parameterized supply functions are designed to ensure that every consumer's load adjustment is within an exogenous capacity limit that is determined by the current power system operating condition. We show that the proposed mechanism yields bounded efficiency loss at a Nash equilibrium. In particular, the proposed mechanism is shown to achieve approximate social optimality at a Nash equilibrium, if the total capacity of all consumers (excluding the consumer with the largest capacity) is much larger than the total amount of load to be adjusted. We complement our analysis through numerical case studies.

Item Type:Book Section
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URLURL TypeDescription Article
Low, Steven0000-0001-6476-3048
Additional Information:© 2016 IEEE.
Subject Keywords:Nash equilibrium, Load management, Aggregates, Power systems
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170615-105827991
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Official Citation:Yunjian Xu, Na Li and S. Low, "Demand response with capacity constrained supply function bidding," 2016 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting (PESGM), Boston, MA, 2016, pp. 1-1. doi: 10.1109/PESGM.2016.7741247 URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:78250
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:15 Jun 2017 20:39
Last Modified:09 Mar 2020 13:19

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