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Plott, Charles R. (2017) Manipulation. Social Science Working Paper, 1429. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA.

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[Introduction] Systematic opportunities for manipulation emerge as a by-product of the structure of all group decision processes. Theory suggests that no process is immune. The study of manipulation provides principles and insights about how parts of complex decision systems work together and how changes in one part can have broad impact. Thus, manipulation strategies are derived from many features of voting processes. Often they are the product of changes in the decision environment, including rules, procedures and influence on others, in order to achieve a specific purpose. The issues and variables go beyond individual’s own voting strategy within a specific setting and whether or not preferences are truthfully revealed – an issue often studied. Hopefully, the insights can lead to avenues for improvements to decision processes and thus, produce a better understanding of process vulnerabilities.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:The comments of Ali Ozkes are greatly appreciated.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1429
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170707-094613945
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:78838
Deposited By: Hanna Storlie
Deposited On:13 Jul 2017 17:15
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:12

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