Fine, Leslie and Goeree, Jacob K. and Ishikida, Tak and Ledyard, John O. (2016) ACE: A Combinatorial Market Mechanism. Social Science Working Paper, 1424. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170707-110629443
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Abstract
In 1990 the South Coast Air Quality Management District created a tradable emissions program to more efficiently manage the ex- tremely bad emissions in the Los Angeles basin. The program created 136 different assets that an environmental engineer could use to cover emissions in place of installing expensive abatement equipment. Standard markets could not deal with this complexity and little trading occurred. A new combinatorial market was created in response and operated successfully for many years. That market design, called ACE (approximate competitive equilibrium), is described in detail and its successful performance in practice is analyzed.
| Item Type: | Report or Paper (Working Paper) | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | To appear in Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Cambridge University Press. John Ledyard would like to thank NSF for its support under grants numbered 1216024-ICES: Large: Collaborative Research: Markets - Algorithms, Applications and the Digital Economy and 1518941-NeTS: Large: Networked Markets: Theory and Applications. | ||||||
| Group: | Social Science Working Papers | ||||||
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| Series Name: | Social Science Working Paper | ||||||
| Issue or Number: | 1424 | ||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20170707-110629443 | ||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170707-110629443 | ||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||
| ID Code: | 78852 | ||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||
| Deposited By: | Hanna Storlie | ||||||
| Deposited On: | 13 Jul 2017 16:41 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 18:12 |
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