Green, Edward J. (1982) Noncooperative Price Taking in Large Dynamic Markets. In: Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition. Academic Press , New York, NY, pp. 37-64. ISBN 978-0-12-476750-8. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170712-154124355
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Abstract
This chapter discusses noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets. Cournot's proposition that large markets are competitive is reconciled with the possibility of equilibrium involving strategic interaction among firms. It is shown that, except when extraordinarily precise information is available, firms in a market with many agents are not visible enough for the equilibrium described by Stigler to be sustained. This result is proved by studying two formal representations of markets with many agents. One of these representations involves initially choosing a particular market, with finitely many participants, and then forming a sequence of increasingly large markets by adjoining at each stage a new copy of the original one. The result of this procedure is called a sequence of replica markets. All of the markets in the sequence have the same statistical characteristics, the ratio of firms to consumers is constant, and they all share the same competitive market-clearing prices. The other representation of markets with many agents exploits the fact that, if counting measure on the set of agents in a market is normalized to make the set into a probability space, then a description of agents' characteristics and actions is mathematically a random vector defined on the sample space of agents.
| Item Type: | Book Section | |||||||||
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| Additional Information: | © 1982 Academic Press, Inc. Received March 21, 1979. Financial support for this research was provided through a grant from the Sloan Foundation to the Princeton University Economics Department. I would like to express my appreciation to Edward Prescott, who drew my attention to the problem studied here. I am grateful to Robert Anderson and Hugo Sonnenschein for discussions and suggestions which have greatly improved the paper. | |||||||||
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| DOI: | 10.1016/B978-0-12-476750-8.50007-5 | |||||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20170712-154124355 | |||||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170712-154124355 | |||||||||
| Official Citation: | EDWARD J. GREEN, Noncooperative Price Taking in Large Dynamic Markets, In Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition, edited by Andreu Mas-Colell,, Academic Press, 1982, Pages 37-64, ISBN 9780124767508, https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-476750-8.50007-5. | |||||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | |||||||||
| ID Code: | 79032 | |||||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | |||||||||
| Deposited By: | Tony Diaz | |||||||||
| Deposited On: | 13 Jul 2017 02:43 | |||||||||
| Last Modified: | 15 Nov 2021 17:45 |
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