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Scheduling Auctions and Proto-Parties in Legislatures

Čopič, Jernej and Katz, Jonathan N. (2014) Scheduling Auctions and Proto-Parties in Legislatures. Social Science Working Paper, 1387. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-143507538

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Abstract

We consider the impact of the scarcity of plenary time in legislatures both on the outcome of the legislative bargaining process and the organization of the legislature itself. We do so by developing a novel model that we call scheduling auctions. In the model, the legislature is charged with allocating a fixed budget. Members can propose an allocation and the scheduling agent decides which one of the possible proposals will be considered by the entire legislature in plenary session for an up or down vote. We show in this simple setting that deciding which member should be selected as the scheduling agent endogenously induces the creation of nascent political parties that we call proto-parties. We also show that the these legislative structures have positive welfare implications.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Katz, Jonathan N.0000-0002-5287-3503
Additional Information:We are grateful to David Baron, Douglas Bernheim, Gary Cox, Daniel Diermeier, Harold Demsetz, Timothy Feddersen, Matias Iaryczower, Matthew Jackson, Matt Kahn, Preston McAfee, Kenneth Shepsle, Guido Tabellini, Barry Weingast, and William Zame, as well as seminar audiences at WZB, UCSD, Universidad de Granada, and CERGE.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1387
Classification Code:JEL: C78, D44, D71, D72
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-143507538
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-143507538
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79438
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Hanna Storlie
Deposited On:07 Aug 2017 21:44
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:20

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