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Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games

Hortala-Vallve, Rafael and Llorente-Saguer, Aniol (2010) Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games. Social Science Working Paper, 1335. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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We analyze a Colonel Blotto game in which opposing parties have differing relative intensities (i.e. the game is non-zero sum). We characterize the colonels' payoffs that sustain a pure strategy equilibrium and present an algorithm that reaches the equilibrium actions (when they exist). Finally we show that the set of games with a pure strategy equilibria is non-empty.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:We thank Antonio Cabrales and Antoni Rubi for helpful comments.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1335
Classification Code:JEL: C72, D7, P16
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-144614816
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79441
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:07 Aug 2017 21:40
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:20

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