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The Pro-Competitive Effect of Campaign Limits in Non-Majoritarian Elections

Iaryczower, Matias and Mattozzi, Andrea (2010) The Pro-Competitive Effect of Campaign Limits in Non-Majoritarian Elections. Social Science Working Paper, 1319. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-160811555

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Abstract

We study a model of elections in non-majoritarian systems that captures the link between competition in policies and competition in campaign spending. We argue that the overall competitiveness of the political arena depends both on the endogenous number of parties contesting the election and the endogenous level of campaign spending. These two dimensions are linked together through their combined effect on the total equilibrium level of political rents. We illustrate the key insights of the model through the analysis of two major electoral institutions: campaign spending limits and compulsory voting. In particular, we show that under some conditions spending caps and compulsory voting can be pro-competitive, leading to an increase in the number of parties contesting the elections.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170807-132406821Related ItemPublished Article
Additional Information:Mattozzi acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation, SES-0617901. Published in Economic Theory Volume 49, Issue 3, pp 591–619
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFSES-0617901
Subject Keywords:elections, proportional representation, campaign finance, abstention, valence
Classification Code:JEL: D72, D78, C72
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-160811555
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-160811555
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79460
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:07 Aug 2017 20:03
Last Modified:26 Apr 2019 21:04

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