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Finding All Equilibria

Echenique, Federico (2002) Finding All Equilibria. Social Science Working Paper, 1153. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-162258184

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Abstract

I present a simple and fast algorithm that finds all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria in games with strategic complementarities. This is the first non-trivial algorithm for finding all pure-strategy Nash equilibria.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Echenique, Federico0000-0002-1567-6770
Additional Information:I thank Matt Jackson, Ivana Komunjer, and Andy McLennan for comments and suggestions on an early draft. Published as Echenique, F. (2007). Finding all equilibria in games of strategic complements. Journal of Economic Theory, 135(1), 514-532.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:supermodular games, strategic complementarities, complexity, Robinson-Topkis algorithm
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1153
Classification Code:JEL: C63,C72
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-162258184
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170726-162258184
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79463
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:02 Aug 2017 20:33
Last Modified:26 Nov 2019 11:15

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