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How to control controlled school choice

Echenique, Federico and Yenmez, M. Bumin (2012) How to control controlled school choice. Social Science Working Paper, 1366. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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We characterize choice rules for schools that regard students as substitutes, while at the same time expressing preferences for the diversity composition of the student body. The stable (or fair) assignment of students to schools requires the latter to regard the former as substitutes. Such a requirement is in conflict with the reality of schools’ preferences for a diverse student body. We show that the conflict can be useful, in the sense that certain unique rules emerge from imposing both considerations.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemPublished Article
Echenique, Federico0000-0002-1567-6770
Additional Information:We thank Estelle Cantillon for her helpful comments, as well as seminar audiences at MIT/Harvard, ECARES, Sciences-Po, University of Arizona, University of California-Davis, University of California-Irvine, University of Montreal.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Matching, Market Design, Gale-Shapley, School Choice, Diversity
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1366
Classification Code:JEL: D47, D71
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-090931100
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79480
Deposited By: Hanna Storlie
Deposited On:07 Aug 2017 18:32
Last Modified:26 Nov 2019 11:15

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