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Symmetric play in repeated allocation games

Kuzmics, Christoph and Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rogers, Brian W. (2012) Symmetric play in repeated allocation games. Social Science Working Paper, 1363. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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We study symmetric play in a class of repeated games when players are patient. We show that, while the use of symmetric strategy profiles essentially does not restrict the set of feasible payoffs, the set of equilibrium payoffs is an interesting proper subset of the feasible and individually rational set. We also provide a theory of how rational individuals play these games, identifying particular strategies as focal through the considerations of Pareto optimality and simplicity. We report experiments that support many aspects of this theory.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:The paper has benefited from comments by participants of seminars at University of Arizona, UC San Diego, University of Cambridge, University of Iowa, University of Konstanz, Northwestern University, University of Oxford, University of Pittsburgh, Virginia Tech, University of Warwick, University of Wisconsin, and from conference presentations at the Second Transatlantic Theory Conference (2009), the 2010 Midwest Economic Theory Conference (MWIEG), the 2010 Canadian Theory Conference, and the April 2011 Midwest Political Science Association. Palfrey gratefully acknowledges the financial support from grants by the National Science Foundation (SES-0962802) and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Gordon and Betty Moore FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:symmetry, repeated games, focal points, experiments
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1363
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-092437236
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79482
Deposited By: Hanna Storlie
Deposited On:07 Aug 2017 18:30
Last Modified:22 Nov 2019 09:58

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