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Vote trading with and without party leaders

Casella, Alessandra and Palfrey, Thomas R. and Turban, Sébastien (2012) Vote trading with and without party leaders. Social Science Working Paper, 1359. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority. Individuals have different, privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money. We study the implication of such trading for outcomes and welfare when trades are coordinated by the two group leaders and when they take place anonymously in a competitive market. The theory has strong predictions. In both cases, trading falls short of full efficiency, but for opposite reasons: with group leaders, the minority wins too rarely; with market trades, the minority wins too often. As a result, with group leaders, vote trading improves over no-trade; with market trades, vote trading can be welfare reducing. All predictions are strongly supported by experimental results.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:We thank participants to the ESA 2011 meeting in Tucson and to seminars at Caltech, NYU, the Paris School of Economics, and Polytechnique for helpful comments. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation (SES-0617820,SES-0617934, and SES-0962802), the Center for Experimental Social Science at NYU, and the Social Science Experimental Laboratory at Caltech. Casella thanks the Paris School of Eocnomics for its hospitality, and the Alliance Program.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NYU Center for Experimental Social Science (CESS)UNSPECIFIED
Caltech Social Science Experimental LaboratoryUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:markets, experiments
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1359
Classification Code:JEL: D51, C92, D72
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-100308276
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79485
Deposited By: Hanna Storlie
Deposited On:02 Aug 2017 21:47
Last Modified:19 Nov 2020 18:23

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