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Cooperation Without Immediate Reciprocity: An Experiment in Favor Exchange

Roy, Nilanjan (2012) Cooperation Without Immediate Reciprocity: An Experiment in Favor Exchange. Social Science Working Paper, 1358. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-102025513

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Abstract

This paper presents experimental evidence concerned with behavior in indefinite horizon two-person dynamic favor exchange games. Subjects interact in pairs in continuous time and occasionally one of them receives opportunity to provide a favor to her partner. The effects of changing the benefit of receiving a favor and the arrival rate of opportunities to do a favor are studied when the opportunities are privately observed. Also considered are the impacts of informational access to partner’s opportunities on efficiency and the overall behavior of individuals with respect to “obvious” state variables.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:I am grateful to Thomas Palfrey for excellent guidance and generous support for running the experiments. The funding from Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. I am also thankful to Chris Crabbe for developing the experimental software. Federico Echenique, Ben Gillen, Julian Romero and Matthew Shum provided helpful suggestions.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Gordon and Betty Moore FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:favor exchange, continuous time games, private information, infinite horizon, chips mechanisms
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1358
Classification Code:JEL: C72, C73, C91, C92, D82
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-102025513
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-102025513
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79486
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Hanna Storlie
Deposited On:02 Aug 2017 21:46
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:20

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