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The Testable Implications of Zero-sum Games

Lee, Sangmok (2009) The Testable Implications of Zero-sum Games. Social Science Working Paper, 1303. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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We study Nash-rationalizable joint choice behavior under restriction on zero- sum games. We show that interchangeability of choice behavior is the only additional condition which distinguishes zero-sum games from general non-cooperative games with respect to testable implications. This observation implies that in some sense interchangeability is not only a necessary but also a sufficient property which differentiates zero-sum games.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:I am grateful to Christopher Chambers and Federico Echenique for encouraging and guiding me in working on this paper. I am also thankful to Ruth Mendel and Luke Boosey for corrections and neatly reorganizing the proofs. Published as Lee, S. (2012). The testable implications of zero-sum games. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 48(1), 39-46.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Interchangeability, Nash-rationalizability, Revealed preference, Zero-sum game
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1303
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-143423913
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79503
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:02 Aug 2017 21:08
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:20

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