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Market Design for Fishery IFQ Programs

Ledyard, John O. (2009) Market Design for Fishery IFQ Programs. Social Science Working Paper, 1301. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-150205866

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Abstract

I examine the impact of market design on the performance of a cap-and-trade program for Individual Fishing Quotas. In equilibrium, neither the term of the quota, the number of years for which it is valid, nor the method of initial allocation, granting or selling, has a differential effect on the protability of the shery or the quality of the environment. However, the term of the quota and the method of initialization can have a big impact on the price discovery process and whether equilibrium is attained. Because of this, both the fishery and the environment can be significantly better off with a mixture of historically based grants and auctions with some form of limited term quotas. I also discuss some additional benefits from an initialization process that generates some revenue for the public. Section 5 contains a summary.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:This paper was prepared with the financial support of the Natural Resources Defense Council and Ecotrust. Ed Backus Karen Garrison, and Astrid Scholz provided valuable intellectual assistance. They are, of course, not responsible for any of the content.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
National Resources Defense CouncilUNSPECIFIED
EcotrustUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Market Design, Individual Fishing Quotas, Term Quotas, Auctions
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-150205866
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-150205866
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79505
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:02 Aug 2017 20:52
Last Modified:02 Aug 2017 20:52

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