Published March 2009
| Version Published
Working Paper
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Inequality aversion and risk aversion
Creators
Abstract
This note shows that for two social welfare functions which are inequality averse and anonymous, if one is more inequality averse than the other, it induces a more risk averse household through optimal sharing than the other. We present examples showing that this comparative static can be reversed if either the property of inequality aversion or anonymity is dropped.
Additional Information
This note grew out of discussions with Federico Echenique and Mark Machina, toward whom I am grateful. Published as Chambers, C. P. (2012). Inequality aversion and risk aversion. Journal of Economic Theory, 147(4), 1642-1651.Attached Files
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Additional details
Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 79506
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-151232544
Related works
- Describes
- http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171102-171702434 (URL)
Dates
- Created
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2017-08-02Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2020-03-09Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1300