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A citizen candidate model with private information and unique equilibrium

Großer, Jens and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2008) A citizen candidate model with private information and unique equilibrium. Social Science Working Paper, 1292. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-163611649

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Abstract

We study a citizen candidate model where citizen ideal points are private information and each ideal point is an independent draw from a uniform distribution. We characterize the equilibrium as a function of the entry cost, the office-holding benefit, and the number of citizens. In contrast to the standard citizen candidate models, equilibrium is unique. Entry is from the extremes of the distribution. A citizen enters if and only if her ideal point greater than or equal to some critical distance from the expected median. Expected policies are more extreme as entry costs increase or office-holding benefits decrease, and as the number of citizens increases.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160301-142744314Related ItemLater version published in The Political Economy of Democracy (2009)
Additional Information:Prepared for presentation at The Workshop on The Political Economy of Democracy, Barcelona, June 5-7, 2008, sponsored by Fundación BBVA, CSIC, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, and Universitat Pompeu Fabra. We thank the audience for their comments. Palfrey also acknowledges the financial support of the National Science Foundation (SES-0617820) and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation. Großer acknowledges the support and hospitality of the Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science (PLESS) and Economics Department. Published as Großer, J. and Palfrey, T.R. (2009) A Citizen-Candidate Model with Private Information. The Political Economy of Democracy, eds. E. Aragones, C. Bevia, H. Llavador, and N. Scholfield. Madrid, Spain: Fundación BBVA.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFSES-0617820
Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation UNSPECIFIED
Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science (PLESS)UNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:citizen candidates, entry, elections
Classification Code:JEL: D72, D82
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-163611649
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-163611649
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79514
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:02 Aug 2017 20:30
Last Modified:07 Nov 2017 18:37

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