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Network Architecture, Salience and Coordination

Choi, Syngjoo and Gale, Douglas and Kariv, Shachar and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2009) Network Architecture, Salience and Coordination. Social Science Working Paper, 1291. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation of monotone games with imperfect information. Players are located at the nodes of a network and observe the actions of other players only if they are connected by the network. These games have many sequential equilibria; nonetheless, the behavior of subjects in the laboratory is predictable. The network architecture makes some strategies salient and this in turn makes the subjects’ behavior predictable and facilitates coordination on efficient outcomes. In some cases, modal behavior corresponds to equilibrium strategies.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemSupplementary Material
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:Revised version. Original: July 2008. This research was supported by the Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science (PLESS) and the UC Berkeley Experimental Social Science Laboratory (Xlab). The paper has benefited from suggestions by the participants of seminars at several universities. We acknowledge The National Science Foundation for support under grants SBR-0095109 (Gale), SES-0617955 (Gale and Kariv), and SES-0617820 (Palfrey) and The Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (Palfrey). Kariv is grateful for the hospitality of the School of Social Science in the Institute for Advanced Studies. Published as Choi, Syngjoo and Gale, Douglas and Kariv, Shachar and Palfrey, Thomas. (2011) Network architecture, salience and coordination. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(1):76-90.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Gordon and Betty Moore FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science (PLESS)UNSPECIFIED
UC Berkeley Experimental Social Science Laboratory (Xlab)UNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:experiment, monotone games, imperfect information, networks, coordination, strategic commitment, strategic delay, equilibrium selection, salience
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1291
Classification Code:JEL: D82, D83, C92
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-165659587
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79517
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:02 Aug 2017 20:27
Last Modified:22 Nov 2019 09:58

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