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Information aggregation in standing and ad hoc committees

Jacob, S. Nageeb Ali and Goeree, Jacob K. and Kartik, Navin and Palfrey, Thomas R. (2008) Information aggregation in standing and ad hoc committees. Social Science Working Paper, 1280R. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment comparing voting behavior and decision making efficiency in standing and ad hoc committees, where decisions are made by unanimity rule. We also compare sequential and simultaneous (secret ballot) voting procedures. The data are remarkably consistent across treatments, in both qualitative (comparative statics) and quantitative terms. The different procedures and the ad hoc or standing nature of the committees generally do not seem to lead to the selection of different equilibria, with the exception of some evidence of bandwagon effects in the sequential procedure.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemPublished Version
Goeree, Jacob K.0000-0001-9876-3425
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:Revised version. Original: December 2007. This paper was prepared for the invited session “Information Aggregation by Voting” at the 2008 AEA Meetings, New Orleans. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation (SES-0079301, SES-0450712, SES-0551014), the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, the Dutch National Science Foundation (VICI 453.03.606), CASSEL at UCLA, SSEL at Caltech, and the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. We thank David Austen-Smith for comments, and Chulyoung Kim, Uliana Popova, and Stephanie Wang for research assistance. Published as Ali, S.N., Goeree, J.K., Kartik, N., & Palfrey, T.R. (2008). Information aggregation in standing and ad hoc committees. The American economic review, 98(2), 181-186.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Gordon and Betty Moore FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO)VICI 453.03.606
California Social Science Experimental Laboratory (CASSEL)UNSPECIFIED
Caltech Social Science Experimental LaboratoryUNSPECIFIED
Institute for Advanced StudyUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:experiment, committees, information aggregation, voting, jury, elections
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1280R
Classification Code:JEL: C92, D71, D82
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170728-145558781
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79556
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:02 Aug 2017 18:48
Last Modified:22 Nov 2019 09:58

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