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The “Reasonable Man” and other legal standards

Miller, Alan D. (2007) The “Reasonable Man” and other legal standards. Social Science Working Paper, 1277. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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In the common law of negligence, an individual breaches the duty of due care if she fails to act as would a “reasonable man” under the circumstances. A natural question, first posed by Rubinstein [8], is whether the “reasonable man” can be derived from the views of actual agents. Rubinstein introduced an axiomatic model and showed that there does not exist a non-dictatorial aggregation method which satisfies several normatively appealing properties. I introduce a new model based on a different understanding of the “reasonable man” and provide a characterization of the “union rule”, the most inclusive view of reasonableness satisfying a basic Pareto criterion. The union rule requires that a jury must unanimously agree to find a defendant liable for negligence.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:Helpful comments were provided by Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique, Philip T. Hoffman, Matias Iaryczower, D. Roderick Kiewiet, R. Preston McAfee, Stuart McDonald, Robert Ostling, Dov Samet, Eran Shmaya, Matthew Spitzer, Yair Tauman, Oscar Volij, David Wettstein, and seminar participants at the California Institute of Technology and at the Eighteenth International Conference on Game Theory. All errors are my own.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Reasonable Man, Negligence Juries, Social Choice, Aggregation, Axioms, Union Rule
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1277
Classification Code:JEL: D70, D71, D72, K00, K13, K40
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170728-152555784
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79561
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:02 Aug 2017 18:47
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:21

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