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Strategic Voting in Sequential Committees

Iaryczower, Matias (2007) Strategic Voting in Sequential Committees. Social Science Working Paper, 1275. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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We consider strategic voting with incomplete information and partially common values in sequential committees. A proposal is considered against the status quo in one committee, and only upon its approval advances for consideration in a second committee. Committee members (i) are privately and imperfectly informed about an unobservable state of nature which is relevant to their payoffs, and (ii) have a publicly observable bias with which they evaluate information. We show that the tally of votes in the originating committee can aggregate and transmit relevant information for members of the second committee in equilibrium, provide conditions for the composition and size of committees under which this occurs, and characterize all three classes of voting equilibria with relevant informative voting.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:I am thankful to to Juliana Bambaci, Randy Calvert, Federico Echenique, Navin Kartik, Santiago Oliveros, and participants at the MPSA annual conference for comments to earlier versions of this paper. All errors remain my own.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:strategic voting, committees, information aggregation, sequential voting, bicameral legislatures
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1275
Classification Code:JEL: D72, D78, C72
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170728-153442527
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79562
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:02 Aug 2017 18:47
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:21

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