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Sequential Entry in Many-to-one Matching Markets

Boyle, Elette and Echenique, Federico (2007) Sequential Entry in Many-to-one Matching Markets. Social Science Working Paper, 1269. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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We study sequential bargaining in many-to-one matching markets. We show that there is an advantage to entering late in the market, and that the last agent to enter the market will receive his or her best partner in a stable matching, extending the results of Blum and Rothblum (2002) and Cechlárová (2002) for the marriage model. We also discuss the relation between sequential bargaining and a possible alternative formulation based on the NTU Shapley value.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemPublished Version
Echenique, Federico0000-0002-1567-6770
Additional Information:We thank Peter Biró and Utku Ünver for their advice on the related literature. Published as Boyle, E., & Echenique, F. (2009). Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets. Social Choice and Welfare, 33(1), 87-99.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Stable Matchings, Sequential Entry, Shapley Value, Coalitional Monotonicity
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1269
Classification Code:JEL: C71, C78
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170728-162757118
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79571
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:01 Aug 2017 23:22
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:21

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