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A Model of Elections with Spatial and Distributive Preferences

Hsu, Ming (2004) A Model of Elections with Spatial and Distributive Preferences. Social Science Working Paper, 1198. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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This paper introduces a model where elections are games where voters have preferences over a public good (policy platforms) and a private good (transfers). The model produces the standard social choice results such as core convergence and policy separation. Furthermore, by introducing transfers, I am able to make more precise predictions about candidate locations and their dynamics than is possible under the standard spatial model. Another purpose of this paper lies in the creation of favored groups in elections. Ultimately, it is important to characterize political behavior while considering the different preferences that might exist in the constituents. By incorporating utility for private goods into standard utility assumptions, this model introduces these considerations into the standard spatial model, allowing us to have a richer and more nuanced look into elections.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Downsian model, equilibration, non-equilibrium behavior
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1198
Classification Code:JEL: C72, D72, D78
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-132542621
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79606
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:01 Aug 2017 23:17
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:21

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