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Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation

Charness, Gary and Jackson, Matthew O. (2004) Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation. Social Science Working Paper, 1193. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA.

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We study games played between groups of players, where a given group decides which strategy it will play through a vote by its members. When groups consist of two voting players, our games can also be interpreted as network-formation games. In experiments on Stag Hunt games, we find that that the structure of the voting rule completely determines which equilibrium is played, independently of the payoff structure. Thus, we find a stark contrast between how groups and individuals play our games, with payoffs playing a much more important role in equilibrium selection in the latter case. We also explore play between groups where one member of each group dictates the play of that group. We find that the dictator tends to play a less risky strategy when choosing for a group than when playing only for him or herself. We develop a new solution concept, robust-belief equilibrium, which explains the data that we observe. We provide results showing that this solution concept has application beyond the particular games in our experiments.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemLater version published in Journal of Economic Theory
Jackson, Matthew O.0000-0001-9846-4249
Additional Information:Financial support from the Lee Center for Advanced Networking is gratefully acknowledged. Published as Charness, G., & Jackson, M.O. (2007). Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation. Journal of Economic Theory, 136(1), 417-445.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Caltech Lee Center for Advanced NetworkingUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Groups, Networks, Game Theory, Equilibrium Selection, Equilibrium Refinement, Majority Voting, Group Play, Robust-belief Equilibrium, Responsibility
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1193
Classification Code:JEL: A14, C72, C91, D71, D72
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-141927016
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79613
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:01 Aug 2017 23:06
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:22

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