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The Relevance of a Choice of Auction Format in a Competitive Environment

Jackson, Matthew O. and Kremer, Ilan (2004) The Relevance of a Choice of Auction Format in a Competitive Environment. Social Science Working Paper, 1190. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-145236001

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Abstract

We examine the relevance of an auction format in a competitive environment by analyzing and comparing uniform and discriminatory price auctions with many bidders. We show that if the number of objects for sale is small relative to the number of bidders, then all equilibria of both auctions are approximately efficient and lead to approximately the same revenue. When the number of objects for sale is proportional to the number of bidders, then the particulars of the auction format matter. All equilibria of the uniform auction are efficient while all of the equilibria of the discriminatory auction are inefficient. The relative revenue rankings of the auction formats can go in either direction, depending on the specifics of the environment.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:JACres06Related ItemPublished Version
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Jackson, Matthew O.0000-0001-9846-4249
Additional Information:We are grateful for financial support from the National Science Foundation under grant SES-9986190. We thank Jeremy Bulow, Tom Palfrey, and Jeroen Swinkels for helpful conversations and suggestions on earlier drafts, and seminar participants at various places for the comments. Published as Jackson, M.O., & Kremer, I. (2006). The relevance of a choice of auction format in a competitive environment. The Review of Economic Studies, 73(4), 961-981.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFSES-9986190
Subject Keywords:auction, competition, discriminatory auction, uniform price auction, Vickrey auction, efficiency, fully revealing prices
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1190
Classification Code:JEL: D44, C72, D41, G14
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-145236001
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-145236001
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79620
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:01 Aug 2017 23:02
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:22

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