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A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets

Echenique, Federico and Oviedo, Jorge (2003) A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets. Social Science Working Paper, 1185. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-153916899

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Abstract

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set, and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The set-wise stable set possesses the canonical conflict/coincidence of interest properties from many-to-one, and one-to-one models. The theory parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core-like solutions, besides the setwise-stable set.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:ECHte06Related ItemPublished Version
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Echenique, Federico0000-0002-1567-6770
Additional Information:We thank John Duggan for several useful discussions. Part of this paper was written during a visit to the Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República, in Uruguay. Published as Echenique, F. and Oviedo, J. (2006) A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. Theoretical Economics, 1(2):233-273.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Matching markets, Core, Lattice, Stability, Substitutability, Tarski's Fixed Point Theorem
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1185
Classification Code:JEL: C78
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-153916899
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-153916899
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79630
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:01 Aug 2017 20:56
Last Modified:26 Nov 2019 11:15

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