Echenique, Federico and Oviedo, Jorge (2003) A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets. Social Science Working Paper, 1185. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-153916899
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Abstract
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set, and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The set-wise stable set possesses the canonical conflict/coincidence of interest properties from many-to-one, and one-to-one models. The theory parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core-like solutions, besides the setwise-stable set.
| Item Type: | Report or Paper (Working Paper) | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | We thank John Duggan for several useful discussions. Part of this paper was written during a visit to the Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República, in Uruguay. Published as Echenique, F. and Oviedo, J. (2006) A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. Theoretical Economics, 1(2):233-273. | ||||||
| Group: | Social Science Working Papers | ||||||
| Subject Keywords: | Matching markets, Core, Lattice, Stability, Substitutability, Tarski's Fixed Point Theorem | ||||||
| Series Name: | Social Science Working Paper | ||||||
| Issue or Number: | 1185 | ||||||
| Classification Code: | JEL: C78 | ||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-153916899 | ||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-153916899 | ||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||
| ID Code: | 79630 | ||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||
| Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone | ||||||
| Deposited On: | 01 Aug 2017 20:56 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 26 Nov 2019 11:15 |
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