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Preference Aggregation under Uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto

Chambers, Christopher P. and Hayashi, Takashi (2003) Preference Aggregation under Uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto. Social Science Working Paper, 1184. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA.

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Following Mongin, we study social aggregation of subjective expected utility preferences in a Savage framework. We argue that each of Savage’s P3 and P4 are incompatible with the strong Pareto property. A representation theorem for social preferences satisfying Pareto indifference and conforming to the state-dependent expected utility model is provided.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemLater version published in Games and Economic Behavior
Chambers, Christopher P.0000-0001-8253-0328
Additional Information:We would like to thank Philippe Mongin and John Weymark for many very helpful comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank Larry Epstein and William Thomson, for many helpful discussions. All errors are our own. Published as Chambers, C.P., & Hayashi, T. (2006). Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto. Games and Economic Behavior, 54(2), 430-440.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Harsanyi’s Theorem, preference aggregation, subjective expected utility, Savage’s axioms
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1184
Classification Code:JEL: D71, D81
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-155251093
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79632
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:01 Aug 2017 20:48
Last Modified:09 Mar 2020 13:18

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