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Virtual Repeated Implementation

Chambers, Christopher P. (2003) Virtual Repeated Implementation. Social Science Working Paper, 1179. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA.

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We show that in the context of repeated implementation, any social choice rule which realizes all alternatives for a positive (yet arbitrarily small) amount of time is Nash implementable. The results complement those of the virtual implementation literature.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ItemLater version published in Economics Letters
Chambers, Christopher P.0000-0001-8253-0328
Additional Information:I would like to thank John Ledyard for comments and suggestions. All errors are my own. Published as Chambers, C.P. (2004). Virtual repeated implementation. Economics Letters, 83(2), 263-268.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:virtual implementation, repeated implementation
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1179
Classification Code:JEL: C72, D60
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-162153289
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79637
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:01 Aug 2017 20:42
Last Modified:09 Mar 2020 13:18

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