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Is the Status Quo Relevant in a Representative Democracy?

Eguia, Jon X. (2003) Is the Status Quo Relevant in a Representative Democracy? Social Science Working Paper, 1176. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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This work studies the effect of the value of the status quo in the candidates’ decisions and policy outcomes in a representative democracy with endogenous candidates. Following the citizen-candidate model due to Besley and Coate (1997) we show, for a unidimensional policy issue and for both an odd and even number of citizens, that some equilibria only hold for certain values of the status quo policy. In particular we find that a moderate status quo rules out equilibrium outcomes in which there is an uncontested candidate and that two-candidate equilibria exist more generally when the number of citizens is even.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:This work has greatly benefited from the generous advice of M. Socorro Puy, Bernardo Moreno, Pablo Amorós (Málaga University), Chris Chambers and Matthew Jackson (California Institute of Technology). Their contribution is gratefully acknowledged. Special thanks are also due to John Duggan, Heidi Kemp and Thomas Palfrey for their helpful comments and suggestions.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Status quo, endogenous candidates.
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1176
Classification Code:JEL: D72, D71
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-163819462
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79642
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:01 Aug 2017 20:38
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:22

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