Border, Kim C. (2003) Reduced Form Auctions Revisited. Social Science Working Paper, 1175. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-164441362
![[img]](https://authors.library.caltech.edu/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png) |
PDF (sswp 1175 - Sep. 2003)
- Submitted Version
See Usage Policy. 231kB |
Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-164441362
Abstract
This note uses Farkas’s Lemma to prove new results on the implementability of general, asymmetric auctions, and to provide simpler proofs of known results for symmetric auctions. The tradeoff is that type spaces are taken to be finite.
| Item Type: | Report or Paper (Working Paper) | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Related URLs: |
| ||||||
| ORCID: |
| ||||||
| Additional Information: | Published as Border, K.C. (2007). Reduced form auctions revisited. Economic Theory, 31(1), 167-181. | ||||||
| Group: | Social Science Working Papers | ||||||
| Subject Keywords: | asymmetric auction, reduced form auction, Farkas Lemma | ||||||
| Series Name: | Social Science Working Paper | ||||||
| Issue or Number: | 1175 | ||||||
| Classification Code: | JEL: D44 | ||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-164441362 | ||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-164441362 | ||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||
| ID Code: | 79645 | ||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||
| Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone | ||||||
| Deposited On: | 01 Aug 2017 20:38 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 18:22 |
Repository Staff Only: item control page
