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Voting Blocs, Coalitions and Parties

Eguia, Jon X. (2006) Voting Blocs, Coalitions and Parties. Social Science Working Paper, 1257. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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In this paper I study the strategic implications of coalition formation in an assembly. A coalition forms a voting bloc to coordinate the voting behavior of its members, acting as a single player and affecting the policy outcome. I prove that there exist stable endogenous voting bloc structures and in an assembly with two parties I show how the incentives to form a bloc depend on the types of the agents, the sizes of the parties, and the rules the blocs use to aggregate their preferences. I also provide an empirical application of the model to the US Supreme Court and I show that justices face a strategic incentive to coalesce into voting blocs.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:I thank Francis Bloch, Anna Bogomolnaia, Matias Iaryczower, Matt Jackson, Andrea Mattozzi and Tom Palfrey for their comments and suggestions. I am grateful to Andrew Martin and Keith Poole for their generous help with the US Supreme Court data.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Voting Bloc, Coalition Formation, Endogenous Parties, Voting Rules
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1257
Classification Code:JEL: D72, D71, C72
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-095722280
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79671
Deposited By: Hanna Storlie
Deposited On:01 Aug 2017 20:20
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:22

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