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Contestable Leaderships: Party Discipline and Vote Buying in Legislatures

Iaryczower, Matias (2006) Contestable Leaderships: Party Discipline and Vote Buying in Legislatures. Social Science Working Paper, 1255. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-102925452

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Abstract

This paper examines the institutional determinants of discipline in legislative parties building on the premise that leaders need to maintain support within the organization to continue leading. Payments distributed by the incumbent on the spot increase the value of promises of future benefits by fostering individuals’ perceived chances that the incumbent will retain her position. The main result of the paper shows, in fact, that the party leader can use promises of future benefits to induce members to vote for a position disliked by the majority of the party only if she also distributes benefits on the spot.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:I am very grateful to David Levine, Andy Atkeson, Hal Cole, Christian Hellwig, Leeat Yariv and Juliana Bambaci for helpful discussions and suggestions. I am also thankful to numerous seminar participants at Caltech, Chicago, Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Maryland, U. Penn, Princeton, Rice, Stanford, UC Berkeley, UCSD, and Washington University in St. Louis, as well as to many others at UCLA, for useful comments to previous versions of this paper.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:political parties, party discipline, leadership, vote buying, pork
Classification Code:JEL: D72, D78, C72
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-102925452
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-102925452
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79674
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Hanna Storlie
Deposited On:01 Aug 2017 20:19
Last Modified:26 Apr 2019 21:57

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