A Caltech Library Service

What Matchings Can Be Stable? The Refutability of Matching Theory

Echenique, Federico (2006) What Matchings Can Be Stable? The Refutability of Matching Theory. Social Science Working Paper, 1252. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

[img] PDF (SSWP 1252 - Apr. 2006) - Submitted Version
See Usage Policy.


Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


When can a collection of matchings be stable, if preferences are unknown? This question lies behind the refutability of matching theory. A preference profile rationalizes a collection of matchings if the matchings are stable under the profile. Matching theory is refutable if there are observations of matchings that cannot be rationalized. I show that the theory is refutable, and provide a characterization of the matchings that can be rationalized.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Echenique, Federico0000-0002-1567-6770
Additional Information:I thank David Ahn, Chris Chambers, Alekos Kechris, Hideo Konishi, Tayfun Sonmez and seminar audiences at UC Berkeley, Boston College, and audiences at the Wallis/Thomson Conference and the Caltech SISL retreat.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Stable Matchings, Gale-Shapley, Core, Refutability
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1252
Classification Code:JEL: C71, C78
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-105611460
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79681
Deposited By: Hanna Storlie
Deposited On:01 Aug 2017 20:16
Last Modified:26 Nov 2019 11:15

Repository Staff Only: item control page