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Nomination Processes and Policy Outcomes

Jackson, Matthew O. and Mathevet, Laurent and Mattes, Kyle (2006) Nomination Processes and Policy Outcomes. Social Science Working Paper, 1250. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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We model and compare three different processes by which political parties nominate candidates for a general election: nominations by party leaders, nominations by a vote of party members, and nominations by a spending competition among potential candidates. We show that in equilibrium, non-median outcomes can result when two parties compete using nominations via any of these processes. We also show that more extreme outcomes can emerge from spending competition than from nominations by votes or by party leaders. When voters (and potential nominees) are free to switch political parties, then median outcomes ensue when nominations are decided by a vote but not when nominations are decided by spending competition.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Jackson, Matthew O.0000-0001-9846-4249
Additional Information:This paper began as part of a class project, and we thank Jon Eguia and Heidi Kamp for their valuable input and insights at early stages of the project. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Sciences, the Guggenheim Foundation, and the National Science Foundation under grant SES-0316493.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral SciencesUNSPECIFIED
John Simon Guggenheim FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:nominations, elections, primaries, party competition, spending competition
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1250
Classification Code:JEL: P16, D72, C72
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-112425972
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79686
Deposited By: Hanna Storlie
Deposited On:01 Aug 2017 20:12
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:22

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