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Strategy-proof Sharing

Mizukami, Hideki and Saijo, Tatsuyoshi and Wakayama, Takuma (2003) Strategy-proof Sharing. Social Science Working Paper, 1170. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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We consider the problem of sharing a good, where agents prefer more to less. In this environment, we prove that a sharing rule satisfies strategy-proofness if and only if it has the quasi-constancy property: no one changes her own share by changing her announcements. Next, by constructing a system of linear equations, we provide a way to find all of the strategy-proof sharing rules, and identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a non-constant, strategy-proof sharing rule. Finally, we show that it is only the equal sharing rule that satisfies strategy-proofness and symmetry.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:This is a revision of a paper entitled “Strategy-proof and Pareto Efficient Arbitration: Construction of Mechanisms.” We are grateful to Shinji Ohseto, Ken-ichi Shimomura, Takehiko Yamato, Dao-Zhi Zeng, and seminar participants at JEA Conference at Oita University for very helpful comments and suggestions.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Strategy-proofness, Bossiness, Non-constancy, Quasi-constancy, Symmetry.
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1170
Classification Code:JEL: C72, D71
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-134753475
Persistent URL:
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79697
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:01 Aug 2017 22:58
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:23

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