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A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency

Jackson, Matthew O. (2003) A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency. Social Science Working Paper, 1161. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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I survey the recent literature on the formation of networks. I provide definitions of network games, a number of examples of models from the literature, and discuss some of what is known about the (in)compatibility of overall societal welfare with individual incentives to form and sever links.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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URLURL TypeDescription ItemPublished Version
Jackson, Matthew O.0000-0001-9846-4249
Additional Information:This was written for the volume Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions, edited by Gabrielle Demange and Myrna Wooders, which was published in 2005 by Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. I thank Jernej Copic, Sanjeev Goyal, and Anne van den Nouweland for comments on earlier drafts. Financial support from the Lee Center for Advanced Networking is gratefully acknowledged. Published as Jackson, M.O. (2005). A survey of network formation models: stability and efficiency. Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions, 11-49.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Caltech Lee Center for Advanced NetworkingUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:networks, network formation, efficiency, stability, allocation rules
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1161
Classification Code:JEL: C71, C72, A14
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-140704727
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79700
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:02 Aug 2017 03:56
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:23

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