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Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms Really Work?

Carson, Timothy N. and Saijo, Tatsuyoshi and Sjöström, Tomas and Yamato, Takehiko (2003) Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms Really Work? Social Science Working Paper, 1165. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-151328081

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Abstract

Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo, et al., (2003) argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, announcing one's true preference may not be a unique dominant strategy, and almost all strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria. For only a subset of strategy-proof mechanisms do the set of Nash equilibria and the set of dominant strategy equilibria coincide. For example, this double coincidence occurs in the Groves mechanism when preferences are single-peaked. We report experiments using two strategy-proof mechanisms where one of them has a large number of Nash equilibria, but the other has a unique Nash equilibrium. We found clear differences in the rate of dominant strategy play between the two.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171103-161701675Related ItemPublished Version
Additional Information:Research was partially supported by the Grant in Aid for Scientific Research 08453001 of the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture in Japan, the Tokyo Center for Economic Research Grant, and the Japan Economic Research Foundation Grant. Published as Cason, T N., Saijo, T., Sjöström, T., & Yamato, T. (2006). Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?. Games and Economic Behavior, 57(2), 206-235.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)08453001
Tokyo Center for Economic ResearchUNSPECIFIED
Japan Economic Research FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:secure implementation, strategy-proofness, pivotal mechanism, Clarke-Groves mechanism, Nash equilibrium, Dominant equilibrium, experiment
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1165
Classification Code:JEL: C92, D71, D78, H41
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-151328081
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-151328081
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79711
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:01 Aug 2017 22:40
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:23

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