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A Social Choice Lemma on Voting over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games

Banks, Jeffrey S. and Duggan, John (2003) A Social Choice Lemma on Voting over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games. Social Science Working Paper, 1163. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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We prove a lemma characterizing majority preferences over lotteries on a subset of Euclidean space. Assuming voters have quadratic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility representations, and assuming existence of a majority undominated (or "core") point, the core voter is decisive: one lottery is majority-preferred to another if and only if this is the preference of the core voter. Several applications of this result to dynamic voting games are discussed.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:Support from the National Science Foundation, grant numbers SES-9975173 and SES-0213738, is gratefully acknowledged. This paper was completed after Jeff Banks's death. I am deeply indebted to him for his friendship and his collaboration on this and many other projects. Published as Banks, J.S., & Duggan, J. (2006). A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games. Social Choice and Welfare, 26(2), 285-304.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Subject Keywords:lotteries, dynamic games, representative voter, decisive voter
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:1163
Classification Code:JEL: C73, D71, D72
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-153654831
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:79716
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:01 Aug 2017 22:53
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:23

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